state-compliance within international environmental agreements. I examined the process of

treaty formation, factors for whether states ratified these treaties, the operating mechanisms

within the agreements binding states to certain actions, and the degree to which states met their

obligations. I focused my studies on five agreements: the Convention on Long-Range

Transboundary Air Pollution’s Helsinki, Sophia, and Oslo Protocols (1985, 1988, and 1994

respectively); the 1989 Montreal Protocol; and the 1991 US-Canada Bilateral Agreement. By

covering a range of bilateral, regional, and global treaties renowned for their success, I seeked to

identify trends in what compelled states to ratify and comply with air pollutant emissions

reductions.

Following my review of the treaties, governmental memos and public statements, news articles,

and scholarly sources, I discovered that behind each successful treaty were patterns of political,

economic, and scientific developments and relationships. Most notably, the snowballing of

public pressure following scientific developments would increase environmental activism and

diplomatic leadership within democratic nations’ governments and industries. When this pattern

occurred within states with an abundance of political and economic power (U.S., U.K.,

Germany) and other similarly powerful nations lacked a unified countermovement against the

treaty within their government, these environmentally-driven states successfully leveraged trade

and political relationships to compel and coerce other states into environmental treaties. The

activities of international governmental organizations, including the United Nations

Environmental Programme (UNEP), the Organization for Economic Co-operation and

Development (OECD), and the European Union (EU), were essential for increasing transparency

of state interests around environmental agreements and facilitating scientific discussions and

collaborations. The promised development of economically-feasible alternatives for lar ge

pollution emitters was also a common factor for state-ratification (ex. low-sulfur coal and nuclear

energy replacing high-sulfur coal and DuPont’s CFC alternatives replacing CFC chemicals).

I would like to use this research as the basis for my Senior Honors Thesis. My topics of interest

include how additional environmental treaties fit the aforementioned pattern of public interest

influencing powerful democratic nations; the success of states and associated international and

non-governmental organizations weaponizing public pressure in sovereign states for

environmental agendas; and the extent that funding from developed states and flexibilities for

meeting emission reductions encourages developing states to ratify and comply with

environmental treaties.

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